Channel rebates and returns policies are common mechanisms for manufacturers to entice retailers to increase their order quantities and sales ultimately. However, when the underlying demand depends on the retail price, it has been known that channel coordination cannot be achieved if only one of these mechanisms is deployed. In this paper, we show that a policy that combines the use of wholesale price, channel rebate, and returns can coordinate a channel with both additive and multiplicative price-dependent demands. In addition to determining the sufficient conditions for the contract parameters associated with the equilibrium policy, we show that multiple equilibrium policies for channel coordination exist. We further explore how the equilibrium policy can be adjusted to achieve Pareto improvement. Other issues such as the maximum amount of expected profit that the manufacturer can share under the coordinated channel, the structural properties of the contracts under both the additive and multiplicative price-dependent demand functions are also discussed.
1 Introduction
To maintain core competence and to achieve cost efficiency, the manufacturing functions and the retail functions are usually handled by two independent entities in most supply chains. However, due to self-interest, their individually optimal decisions often lead to a globally suboptimal decision for the entire supply chain. It is especially true owing to the presence of double marginalization (Spengler 1950) . As a way to improve the coordination between the manufacturer and the retailer, there is an increasing interest in examining what type of supply contracts can be used to achieve channel coordination in the sense that each supply chain partner's objective becomes aligned with the supply chain's objective. Specifically, under a "coordinated" supply contract, the manufacturer (or supplier) issues a contract with certain contractual terms (i.e., incentives) that will entice the retailer (or buyer) to select an optimal order quantity that is also optimal for the entire supply chain. Common contracts for coordinating a supply chain with uncertain demand include: (two-part tariff) wholesale price contracts (c.f., Corbett et al. (2004) ); channel rebate policies (c.f., Taylor (2002) ; and returns policies (c.f., Pasternack (1985) ).
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In the retailing industries such as consumer electronics, apparels, and publishing, it is a common practice for retailers to return unsold items at the end of the season to the manufacturer and obtain partial (or full) refund (c.f., Brown et al. (2008) ). Besides returns policies, channel rebates policy is another common mechanism for a manufacturer to induce a retailer to increase her order quantity. However, to ensure that the retailer will pass on the rebate value to consumers, Bell and Dreze (2003) , and Kurata and Yue (2008) argue that the manufacturer should offer "scan back" rebate programs under which the retailer obtains rebates based on the actual sales but not on the order quantity. Popular forms of "scan back" rebate programs that are sales-based include: (1) linear rebates -a 3 fixed rebate value for each unit sold (e.g., in Merx and Ridder 2007) ; (2) target sales rebates -a fixed rebate value for each unit sold beyond a pre-specified target level (e.g., Taylor 2002) ; and (3) progressive rebates -the rebate value for each unit sold is progressive according to different tiers. Notice that the progressive rebates program is a general form of the target sales rebates program, which is also a general form of the linear rebates program. Taylor (2002) shows that, when the retail price is given exogenously, the target sales rebates program can coordinate a two-level supply chain.
While Taylor (2002 and deal with sales-effort dependent demand, we consider price-dependent demand in this paper. Besides the fact that these two demand settings lead to different analyses, we believe that our paper complements Taylor's work in two fundamental ways. First, based on our interviews with various representatives of manufacturers and retailers in Hong Kong, all interviewees believe that retail price is the most important factor that drives demand because of the following reasons: (1) consumers are more responsive to price promotions than other marketing instruments (c.f., Ho et al. (2009) ); (2) retailers can use price promotions to negotiate lower wholesale prices with the manufacturers; and (3) retail price can be easily measured and observed by the manufacturers, retailers and consumers. Second, besides the fact that retail price is a key decision in retailing, supply chain coordination with price dependent demand is a technically challenging research topic and is not well understood (e.g., Song et al. 2008) .
Hence, our analysis and insights contribute to the literature. 3 To obtain a better understanding of different rebates and returns policies being used in practice, we interviewed various company representatives of different manufacturers 3 While sales effort and retail price are related, the relationship is not well understood. This deserves further examination in the future. 4 and retailers in Hong Kong. 4 We learned that Rolex offers linear rebates, Levi's offers target sales rebates to retailers, JSJS Amour (a Taiwanese cosmetics manufacturer) offers progressive rebates, and Marathon Sport (a retail chain store)'s supplier applies both channel rebate contract and returns policy together. In most cases, the rebate value is set according to a percentage of the wholesale price. Some specific details of various rebates and returns policies resulted from our interviews are provided in Table 1 .1. To simulate sales for new models or slow moving models, Rolex offers its dealers rebate value that can be as high as 15% of the suggested retailed price (i.e., MSRP). In some cases, the rebate program is based on order quantity, not based on the actual sales quantity.
Xerox's "Xtra Partner" Program
To provide incentive for resellers to sell more printers in small and medium size markets dominated by HP, Xerox offers a rebate program takes the form of the progressive rebates based on different tier levels.
Marathon Sport's Target Sales Rebate and Returns Program
Marathon Sport is one of the largest sportswear retailers in Hong Kong who sells multiple brands of sports apparels. Different manufacturers (such as Nike or Adidas) offer different target sales rebate programs with different durations that vary between one to two months. Marathon Sport can earn a rebate value for each item (approximately 1% to 1.5% of the wholesale price) only when Marathon Sport sells more than a pre-specified sales target. To reduce the risk of overstocking due to the rebate program, Marathon Sport can return unsold items (up to a certain percentage of the order quantity) at the end of the season.
SaSa's Target Sales Rebate Program for skincare products
SaSa is a popular retailer in Hong Kong that sells multiple brands of cosmetics and skincare products. Upon negotiation, various manufacturers such as Estee Lauder and Loreal offer SaSa different sales rebate programs. Some manufacturers offer rebates based on order quantity, where the rebate value is approximately 5-10% of the wholesale price. However, virtually all manufacturers of skincare products offer target rebates so that the rebates will "kick in" only after the sales exceeds certain target levels. In most cases, these sales targets are usually set at 10% above the past sales record (or the projected demand) over a certain time period.
In the majority of supply chain contract literature, it is assumed that the retail price is exogenously given so that the underlying demand distribution is given. However, when the retail price is a decision variable (as commonly observed in practice), the underlying demand becomes price-dependent. As demand becomes price-dependent, it 5 has been known that a contract based on a single mechanism (wholesale price, target sales rebates, or returns) cannot coordinate a decentralized supply chain (c.f., Cachon (2003)) 5 . This observation, together with the observed industrial practices, has motivated us to examine a hybrid contract, known as the Price Rebate and Returns (PRR) contract, that combines the decisions arising from a sales-based rebate policy and a returns policy. Under the PRR policy, the manufacturer makes 4 decisions: the unit wholesale price w, the partial refund value b for each unsold unit returned by the retailer at the end of the season, and the rebate value u for each unit sold beyond the target sales level t. As a response to a PRR policy that is specified by (w, b, t, u) , the retailer makes 2 decisions: the order quantity q and the retail price r.
In this paper, we examine whether a PRR contract can be used to coordinate a decentralized supply chain with both additive and multiplicative price-dependent demands. 6 Instead of examining contracts for maximizing the manufacturer's profit, we are interested in determining the parameters of the PRR contracts that can enable a decentralized supply chain to attain maximum profit for the entire chain for the following reasons: (1) Maximizing supply chain profit can provide a competitive edge for the entire supply chain and its agents in a chain-to-chain competitive environment. By improving the financial health of the entire chain, the supply chain agents are more likely to survive especially during an economic crisis; (2) Operating in a decentralized environment, coordinating the channel can certainly increase the supply chain profit and the split of this gain can be settled among supply chain agents using different negotiation and bargaining 5 Even though a two-part pricing scheme (a transfer payment and a per unit wholesale price) can coordinate the channel for the case of price-dependent demand, the two-part pricing scheme is uncommon in practice (Cachon 2005) . Specifically, when the retailer is more powerful (e.g., Walmart, and SaSa) or when the retailer carries other competing brands of products, the retailer would not participate in the two-part tariff that would allow the manufacturer to extract her surplus. In fact, the representatives we interviewed in Hong Kong were not aware of the two-part tariff scheme in practice. For these reasons, we shall not examine the case of two-part tariff scheme in this paper. 6 Throughout this paper, we use the term "policy" and "contract" interchangeably.
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mechanisms; 7 and (3) Coordinating a decentralized supply chain will enable the manufacturer to ensure that the customer service level achieve the same level as in a centralized system. This is an important issue because the manufacturer's market share depends on the customer service level at the retailer especially when the retailer is selling other competing products.
In this paper, we show that there exist multiple PRR contracts that can achieve channel coordination when both the manufacturer and the retailer are risk-neutral. We also derive analytical conditions for determining the optimal contract (w * , b * , t * , u * ) for both achieving coordination as well as Pareto improvement 8 in the supply chain.
Moreover, we derive the conditions under which the equilibrium (optimal) PRR contract for channel coordination is unique (see Supplementary Appendix A1).
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, ours is the first to examine the PRR policy as a mechanism for coordinating a supply chain with price-dependent demand (for both additive and multiplicative demand cases). Second, we have analytically obtained an upper bound for the manufacturer's share of supply chain's expected profit. Third, we have established the analytical conditions of establishing the PRR policy for achieving Pareto improvement in the supply chain under a decentralized setting. Finally, since the PRR policy is commonly observed in practice, comparing it with the pure wholesale pricing contract would enable us to illustrate the benefits of the PRR policy over the pure wholesale pricing contract.
The organization of the rest of this paper is given as follows. We first conduct a literature review in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the basic models for a centralized 7 The analysis of negotiation and bargaining mechanisms are beyond the scope of this paper. However, as reported in Chiu et al. (2009) , there are multiple PRR contracts that can maximize the supply chain expected profit and the manufacturer has the flexibility to achieve Pareto optimality to ensure all supply chain agents are better off under the coordinated PRR contract. 8 Pareto improvement under the PRR policy refers to the case that both the manufacturer and the retailer will not get worse off (in terms of expected profit) with at least one party getting strictly better off under the PRR policy.
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and a decentralized supply chain under price dependent demands. By using the optimal decisions associated with the centralized supply chain as benchmarks, we establish the existence of multiple PRR policies for coordinating a decentralized supply chain in Section 4. The achievability of Pareto improvement is discussed in Section 5.
Comparisons between the additive and multiplicative models are made in Section 6. This paper ends with some concluding remarks in Section 7. To simplify our exposition, all proofs are provided in the supplementary appendix.
Literature Review
Because the supply chain contract literature is vast and because our PRR policy is a combination of wholesale price, returns and rebates policies, we shall review these three types of contract briefly and refer the reader to Cachon (2003) , Lariviere (1998) , and
Tang (2006) for more details. First, it is well known that a simple wholesale price contract cannot coordinate a supply chain with price-independent demand (i.e., when the retail price is given), but a two-part tariff wholesale price can (c.f., Cachon (2003) ).
Second, Pasternack (1985) shows how a partial refund returns policy can be used to coordinate a supply chain when the demand is price-independent 9 ; however, Emmons and Gilbert (1998) confirm that, while a returns policy can increase the expected profit of the entire supply chain, returns policy alone fails to achieve channel coordination when demand is price-dependent. By considering issues other than channel coordination, there are recent papers that examine returns policy with price-dependent demand.
Specifically, when the demand is multiplicative price-dependent, Song et al. (2008) identify the distribution free necessary and sufficient conditions for obtaining the optimal returns policy which maximizes the expected profit for the manufacturer. The use of an 8 EM (end-of-life, mid-life) returns policy for coordinating a supply chain under a price protection scheme has been examined by Taylor (2001) . Under a dynamic market with exogenously given and declining retail price, Taylor (2001) showed that neither the EM returns policy nor the price protection scheme alone can achieve a Pareto improving supply chain. However, an appropriate setting of a hybrid scheme which combines the EM returns policy and the price protection scheme together can coordinate the supply chain with a Pareto improving result. Also, by exploiting the Pareto-dominant equilibrium for a supply chain with multiple retailers competing on retail price and inventory, Zhao (2008) illustrates how to develop a returns policy that can enhance the efficiency of the supply chain.
It remains to relate our paper to the literature that focuses on sales-based rebates policies. Taylor (2002) is the first to show that the linear rebate policy fails to coordinate the supply chain, while the target sales rebate policy can achieve coordination if the demand is price-independent. Taylor (2002) is also the first to examine supply chain coordination problems with sales effort dependent demand. Recently, when the manufacturer is risk-averse, Zhang et al. (2005) show that returns policies (based on buyback contracts or incremental buyback contracts) and target sales rebate policy can coordinate a supply chain when the demand is price-independent. When demand is price-independent, Lu et al. (2007) analyze a two-period model and show that a policy that combines returns, sales rebate, and price protection policies can coordinate a decentralized supply chain.
When demand is price-dependent, not much is known about the contracts for coordination. As discussed in Cachon (2003) , the channel cannot be coordinated by deploying only one of the policies associated with wholesale price, returns, or rebates.
This observation has motivated researchers to examine whether a combination of these 9 policies can coordinate a supply chain with price-dependent demand. Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) demonstrate the first attempt in this direction. By considering a combined policy (discounted wholesale price and returns), they show that supply chain coordination with a price dependent demand can be achieved. In their model, they consider a "linear price-discount sharing" (LPDS) scheme in which the wholesale price is linearly increasing in the retail price. Hence, the retailer needs to take this wholesale price function into consideration when she determines her retail price and order quantity.
Based on our discussion with various representatives of different manufacturers and retailers in Hong Kong, they have not observed the practice of the LPDS scheme in their companies. However, retailers such as Marathon Sports commented that a policy that combines the target sales rebates and returns (i.e., the PRR policy) is a common practice to entice retailers to meet certain sales targets without incurring a significant risk of overstocking (Table 1 .1). Their comments have motivated us to examine the PRR policy in this paper. Specifically, we show that the PRR policy can be used to coordinate a decentralized supply chain when the demand is additive or multiplicative price-dependent.
We also demonstrate how the manufacturer should determine the contract parameters so as to minimize his downside risk level. Table 2 .1 highlights the key differences between our paper and other related papers in the literature. Consider a two-level supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer (M) sells a single product through the retailer (R) over a short selling season by offering a PRR contract that can be described as follows. At the beginning of the selling season, M makes four decisions: the unit wholesale price w, the refund value b for each unsold unit returned by R at the end of the selling season, the target sales level t and the rebate value u for each unit sold beyond t. For any given PRR contract specified by (w, b, t, u) , R makes two decisions: the order quantity q and the unit retail selling price r.
Under the PRR contract, M and R enter a Stackelberg game in which M acts as the leader and R acts as the follower. The unit production cost incurred by M is denoted by c, and the salvage value of the returned product is v per unit. To ensure M has incentive to produce and R has incentive to sell the product, we assume that r > w > c > v. To eliminate arbitrage value of the returned items, we assume that b > v.
We consider two cases when the product demand depends on the retail price r: (i) A Petruzzi and Dada (1999) ).
Let us consider the case of the additive price dependent demand function. By noting that ) (r
, we can interpret ) (r α as the minimum demand level. Besides the assumption that x has a finite mean, we assume that x has a density function f(⋅) and a distribution function F(⋅) that satisfy the following two properties:
The above assumptions are fairly general. Specifically, property 1 ensures that the 11 traditional newsvendor type solution is unique, and property 2 ensures that the optimal retail price and order quantity are unique (c.f., Petruzzi and Dada (1999) 
For the multiplicative model, the case is similar and hence we omit the details here.
For a notational purpose, we will use "~" to represent the distributions and functions for the case with multiplicative price-dependent demand distribution throughout this paper.
We would omit "~" for dummy variables and cases that there is no confusion.
Additive Price-Dependent Demand Model
We now specify the profit functions associated with the entire supply chain, the retailer, and the manufacturer. Let us establish a benchmark by considering the case when the supply chain is 'centralized' so that the manufacturer and the retailer belong to the same entity. In this case, the relevant decisions are r and q. For any given demand D(r), the profit of the centralized supply chain, denoted by
We now consider the case when the supply chain is 'decentralized' and when the manufacturer and the retailer enter a Stackelberg game as described earlier. In this case, given any PRR contract ) , , , ( t u b w and demand ) (r D , the retailer's profit associated with her decision (r, q) satisfies
where the first term corresponds to the "gross" profit generated from the order quantity q , the second represents the "imputed" cost associated with the returns, and the third represents the rebates to be received from the manufacturer.
Since ) (r α is the minimum demand level, the retailer will always set her decision (q, r) so that ) (r q α ≥ . However, the retailer's profit depends on the "location" of ) (r q α ≥ with respect to the value of t (i.e., the sales target stipulated by the PRR contract determined by the manufacturer). Specifically, the retailer can set her decision (q, r) so
In case (1), as t ≤ α(r) ≤ q, the retailer will always exceed the sales target t because ) (r α is the minimum demand so that the rebate will include a definite amount of
and an uncertain amount that depends on x. Hence, the retailer's expected profit is given as follows,
In case (2), as q t r < < ) ( α , the rebate depends on x and the retailer's expected profit ) , (
In case (3), as t q ≤ , the retailer can never exceed the sales target t. Hence, the retailer's expected profit is,
In summary, the retailer's expected profit can be expressed as:
For a given PRR contract (w, b, u, t) , the retailer will first determine her optimal response 13 ( * i r , * i q ) for case (i) by solving the following sub-problem:
), , ( max 0 , q r P i q w r ≥ ≥ for i = 1, 2, 3, subject to the corresponding constraints t r ≥ ) ( α , q t r < < ) ( α , and t q ≤ , for cases (1), (2), (3), respectively. By comparing the optimal profits associated with those 3 sub-problems, the retailer can retrieve her optimal response *) *, (
By anticipating the retailer's best response *) *, ( R R q r associated with any given PRR contract, we can express the manufacturer's expected profit function as:
Multiplicative Price-Dependent Demand Model
For the multiplicative price dependent demand model; i.e., when 
Channel Coordination
With the expected profit functions derived in Section 3, we now investigate whether a PRR contract can achieve channel coordination. To do so, we first establish the optimal decisions ( * r , * q ) for the centralized supply chain. Then, by treating ( * r , * q ) as a benchmark, we examine conditions under which a PRR contract (w, b, u, t) can coordinate the decentralized supply chain; i.e., a contract that will entice the retailer to set *) *, (
Additive Price-Dependent Demand Model
By considering the supply chain'
given in (3.1), we can use the first-order condition to establish the following result:
Proposition 4.1 For any given r, the optimal supply chain's quantity, ) ( * r q , is given by
is uni-modal in r for r > c.
Proposition 4.1 ascertains that, for any given retail price r, the supply chain's optimal quantity ) ( * r q is equal to the sum of the minimum demand level ) (r α and the classical "newsboy quantity". Also, by substituting the optimal ) ( * r q into (3.1), the second statement implies that the optimal retail price c r > * that maximizes
is unique. Once we determine * r , we can determine the optimal order quantity *). ( * * r= We now examine conditions under which a PRR contract (w, b, u, t) can coordinate the decentralized supply chain by using the following backward induction steps. First, we determine the retailer's best response *) *, ( R R q r for any given PRR contract (w, b, u, t) 15 offered by the manufacturer. Anticipating the retailer's best response *) *, ( R R q r , we determine the optimal PRR contract (w*, b*, u*, t*) that can achieve channel coordination (i.e., a contract that will induce the retailer to select her optimal response ( * R r , * R q ) = (r*,q*)). The following propositions examine the retailer's best response and her corresponding expected profit for any given PRR contract (w, b, u, t).
Proposition 4.2. Under the additive price dependent model: Suppose the manufacturer offers a PRR policy (w, b, u, t). Then, for any retail price r selected by the retailer, the retailer's optimal order quantity ) ( * r q i that maximizes the expected function ) , ( q r P i for i = 1, 2, 3 can be expressed as follows:
given in Proposition 4.2 into (3.2), one can show that:
and fˆ is the mode of the density function f(x); and ) as a function of the PRR contract parameters (w, b, u, t) . By anticipating the retailer's optimal response, we can determine the necessary conditions for a PRR contract (w, b, u, t) that will entice the retailer to set her optimal response retailer's best response to a PRR contract, the manufacturer can determine (w, b, t, u) so that the corresponding PRR contract can achieve channel coordination (i.e., ( * R r , ) ( * r q R ) = ( * r , * q )). Specifically, a PRR contract (w, b, t, u) can achieve channel coordination only if the manufacturer sets (w, b, t, u) as follows:
Case 1. When the manufacturer sets t such that t ≤ α(r*), he also selects w, b, and u so that w = c + u and b = u + v < w.
Case 2. When the manufacturer sets t such that α(r*) < t < q*, he also selects w, b and u so that
Case 3. When the manufacturer sets t such that t ≥ * q , he also selects w, b, and u so that w = c and b = v.
Proposition 4.4 has the following implications. First, it is easy to check that a PRR contract with w = c, b = v, u = 0 (i.e., when the manufacturer sets the wholesale price at cost, the returns value at salvage value, and the rebate value at zero) satisfies the conditions for each of the three cases as stated in Proposition 4.4. In addition, when the manufacturer sets (w, b, t, u) according to Case 3 (i.e., w = c and b = v), it is easy to find that the manufacturer's expected profit is zero. Therefore, there is no incentive for the manufacturer to set t in which t ≥ q*, and, hence, it is sufficient to focus our attention on Cases 1 and 2. Consider Case 1 in which the manufacturer sets t* ≤ *) (r α . By applying Proposition 4.2, we can determine the sufficient conditions for a PRR contract (w*, b*, u*, t*) that can achieve channel coordination (i.e., a contract that will induce the retailer to select her optimal response ( * R r , * R q ) = ( * 1 r , * 1 q ) = (r*, q*), which maximizes her expected profit )] , ( [ q r E R Π = P 1 (r, q) with P 1 (r 1 *, q 1 *) > P 2 (r 2 *, q 2 *) and P 1 (r 1 *, q 1 *) > P 3 (r 3 *, q 3 *)). Specifically, we have: 
Multiplicative Price-Dependent Demand Model
We only show the main results of the multiplicative model here, and then we compare the differences between the multiplicative model and the additive model in Section 6.
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Proposition 4.9 (The multiplicative price dependent demand model.) (a) For any given r, the expected profit function of the centralized supply chain (i.e., )] ,
concave in q, and the optimal order quantity of the supply chain ) ( * r q is given by 
Pareto Improvement

Additive Price-Dependent Demand
For any coordinating PRR contract *) *, *, *, ( t u b w , we have (r R *, q R *) = (r*, q*). We now proceed to examine the conditions under which a coordinating PRR contract will also achieve Pareto improvement so that both the manufacturer and the retailer can obtain a higher expected profit than that of under the pure wholesale pricing (WP) contract. In preparation, let us consider the WP contract under which M decides the wholesale price WP w at the beginning of the selling season. By noting that the WP contract is a special form of a PRR contract with w= WP w , b = v, u = 0, t = 0, the WP contract can be denoted 
Multiplicative Price-Dependent Demand
By using the same approach as presented in Section 5. can yield a higher expected profit for both the manufacturer and the retailer than the equilibrium WP contract, i.e.,
Comparisons between the Additive and Multiplicative Models
Let us compare the results associated with the additive and the multiplicative 26 price-dependent demand models. In this section, we highlight two main differences and one similarity between these two demand models. The similar result between the two demand models follows from Proposition 4.6, Proposition 4.8 and Proposition 4.11 that the manufacturer can never capture the entire supply chain's expected profit under the coordinating PRR contract (w*, b*, u*, t*).
This result can be explained by noticing that if the manufacturer offers a PRR contract that greedily squeezes most of the retailer's expected profit, the retailer will set her retail price r higher so as to maintain her expected profit level even though it will reduce her chance to obtain the sales rebate.
7 Managerial Insights and Conclusion
Coordinating a decentralized supply chain with price-dependent demand has not been fully explored, even though it is known that contracts based on returns, rebates, revenue sharing, and quantity commitment alone fail to achieve coordination. By considering a PRR policy that combines wholesale pricing contract, returns policy and target sales rebate policy, we have shown how a PRR policy can achieve supply chain coordination under both a additive form and a multiplicative form of price dependent demand.
Relative to the additive price-dependent demand model, more conditions are required to satisfy for coordinating the channel in the multiplicative price-dependent model. In addition, we have shown that it is possible to set the optimal contract parameters for the equilibrium PRR contract so that channel coordination along with Pareto improvement can be achieved.
As a future research direction, it is of interest to examine the coordination issue with risk sensitive supply chain agents and investigate the performance of PRR policy in coordinating both the risk level and the expected profit in the supply chain. It will also be interesting to explore how the PRR policy can be applied in a multiple-period setting with multiple retailers. In addition, there are two open research questions regarding PRR contracts. First, it is of interest to determine PRR contracts that maximize the manufacturer's profit subject to the retailer's participation constraints. Second, while we focus on maximizing the total supply chain profit, it would be interesting to examine other solution concepts such as Nash bargaining solution concept that aims to determine PRR contracts that maximize the product of the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits.
Online Supplement Supplementary Appendix (A1): The Minimum Number of Parameters for Achieving Coordination
Both returns policy and target sales rebate policy have two contract parameters and hence the PRR policy has at most four parameters as controls. As we will see from the analysis below, under some situations, the manufacturer can coordinate the supply chain via the PRR policy by controlling only two (three) parameters (and the remaining parameters (parameter) are(is) simply fixed at some arbitrary value). First of all, we assume that all PRR policies that we consider in this section satisfy (4.1). Moreover, we only consider the non-trivial cases (under the model assumption on the cost-revenue parameters) with w* > c, b* > v, u* > 0, and 0 < t* < q* in this appendix.
The following table summarizes the features of the supply chain coordination when only some of the PRR parameters are controllable. 
Supplementary Appendix (A3) A Numerical Example
We now present a numerical example to illustrate the existence of multiple PRR policies that can achieve channel coordination. In our example, we set c = 50, v = 2, k = 10000, a = 25. Also, by assuming that the random variable x~ Normal(1000, 300
2 ), i.e., x is normally distributed with mean 1000 and standard deviation 300, the optimal order quantity q* and the optimal retail price r* for the centralized supply chain are unique.
Based on this set of data, we have q* = 5146, r* = 244.3, α(r*) = k -ar* = 10000 -(25)(244.3) = 3892.5, and E[Π(r*, q*)] = 930387.
When operating in a decentralized supply chain, the manufacturer's expected profit will be lower than the profit attained by the centralized supply chain, i.e., Case 2: α (r*) < t* < q* By considering the fact that α(r*) = 3892.5 and that q* = 5146, it is easy to check from . Also, notice that policies 1 and 2, and policies 3 and 4 satisfy the sufficient conditions as stated in Proposition 4.5 and Proposition 4.7, respectively. Table A3 .1 illustrates the fact that there are multiple optimal PRR policies, but certain optimal policies could yield higher profits for the 36 manufacturer. Please observe that the existence of multiple optimal PRR policies can show the robustness of the respective coordination mechanism in which the manufacturer and the retailer can share different proportions of the optimal supply chain's expected profit with different contract parameters. In essence, the relative bargaining power between the manufacturer and the retailer will play a crucial role in determining the corresponding division of the optimal supply chain's expected profit.
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Supplementary Appendix (All Proofs) Proof of Proposition 4.1: The first order optimality conditions of the supply chain's expected profit are given by 
given, the unique optimal q can be determined by (SA.2). Hence,
is the optimal q of the supply chain for any given r. By putting 
is thus strictly decreasing in r. Let rˆ 
, the first order optimality conditions of maximizing ) , ( 2 q r P are given by (SA.4) and
For a given q, if r satisfies q t r < < ) ( 
